Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment -like damaging public goods -is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Female subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally, subjects' social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices.
Introduction
Many experimental economic studies have investigated the development of cooperation in a social dilemma or public good environment, and the effect of punishment mechanisms in this context (for a recent survey, see Chaudhuri, 2011) . In the real world, however, people can often cooperate with or hurt one another. Interpersonal relationships may even turn sour and induce persistent destructive behavior. Repeated and severe conflict is a very real part of human interaction. Examples are neighborhood conflicts, family feuds, or the destruction of public property by protesters during riots In some studies, a substantial proportion of individuals engaged in the destruction of others' earnings, even when rank egalitarianism and reciprocity motives where not present and when the destruction was costly (Zizzo, 2003; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009 ). To study whether destructive behavior can be experimentally observed and modulated in a public good environment we designed a 'fragile public good' (FPG) game. A key feature of our FPG game is that it gives as much room for destructive behavior (taking) as for for constructive behavior (contributing). More formally, it does so by shifting both the (standard) Nash equilibrium and the status quo -i.e., the initial allocation of tokens to the common account -to the middle of the action space, with perfect symmetry in the marginal cost of taking and contributing. Contrary to the relatively few existing public good experiments that allow for an interior Nash equilibrium (see surveys by Laury and Holt, 2008, and Saijo, 2008) , we particularly focus on destructive actions in a repeated context where subjects can identify the individual decisions of others.
Because framing can influence behavior in public good games (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999 ; for a survey, see Cookson, 2000) , we study the sensitivity of our findings in two additional treatments, where we separate the status quo from the Nash outcome.
In one case, we move the status quo to a corner so that subjects can only contribute, keeping everything else the same; this is a case of positive framing which -in light of the literature -may induce subjects to contribute more. In the other case, we minimally move the Nash outcome away from the status quo towards taking by introducing a slight payoff asymmetry. Here the Nash choice may be read as aggression by subjects using the status quo as a reference point and induce more destructive behavior.
Our main questions are: (1) does the FPG game generate destructive behavior and even cases where behavior equilibrates towards sour relationships?; (2) how does separating the Nash outcome from the status quo through framing or some minimal payoff asymmetry modulate taking and contributing? After the experimental design we present our results, followed by a summary of our main findings.
Experiment
Subjects played the FPG game in fixed dyads over 35 rounds in all three treatments.
Symmetric Treatment (SYM)
In each round both subjects of a dyad are endowed with a private account holding 7 tokens, earning 10 units each, and a common account holding 14 tokens, earning 10 each for both subjects. Subjects can contribute to or take up to 7 tokens from the common account, at increasing marginal costs: moving one token costs 2 units, while the marginal transfer cost of each additional token increases by 2 1 . Earnings are symmetric around the status quo which coincides with the selfish Nash outcome, while any combination of contributions of 4 or 5 is socially optimal.
Framing Treatment (FRAME)
In FRAME subjects have exactly the same strategy space and equivalent earnings, but now they start each round with 14 tokens in their private accounts and the common account is empty. Thus, to reach an outcome equivalent to an outcome in SYM, subjects would have to contribute 7 more tokens than before 2 . Because now only contributions can be made, this is a case of positive framing.
Asymmetric Treatment (ASYM)
ASYM differs from SYM in only two respects: tokens in the private account earn subjects 11 units instead of 10, and the first token transferred in either direction has zero costs. As in FRAME, the Nash equilibrium does not coincide with the status quo, but now it is the former that moves by prescribing to take one token out of the common account, while both subjects contributing 5 tokens is the social optimum 3 .
Subjects did not see the underlying formulas, but were supplied with graphs illustrating the marginal effects of every decision for themselves and the other, alongside with payoff tables 4 .
The public good game was preceded by a test of social value orientation (SVO; see Liebrand and McClintock, 1988, taken from Van Dijk et al., 2002) . This test measures the preferences of subjects for 1 Formally, we use the following payoff function, where c i can be positive or negative:
Instructions are available upon request. distribution outcomes for themselves and a (generalized) other. We use this measure to see whether it can explain behavior in the game. Sessions were run in November and December 2012 and April 2013 at the CREED-lab in Amsterdam. SYM had 130 participants (50% female, 2% unreported gender, average age 22.2), FRAME 54 (41% female, average age 21.5), and ASYM 80 (43% female, average age 21.5).
The experiment had an additional second part, which we do not cover in this paper. The exchange rate of units into euros was 700 to one. Subjects earned on average 1.45 euro in the SVO-test and 10.82 euro in the public good game. Table 1 gives an overview of average contributions, where we adjust for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in each game by subtracting 7 tokens from results in FRAME and adding 1 to results in ASYM. Across all rounds average contributions are approximately 2 tokens above the Nash-prediction in all treatments. The first round, however, reveals a different pattern as the average contribution in FRAME is significantly lower than in SYM (p = 0.001) 5 . Because SYM and ASYM are more similar to a taking game than FRAME (where only contributions are possible), this result contrasts with the general finding that there are typically lower contributions in taking framings, if there is any difference (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Goerg and Walkowitz, 2010) . Khadjavi and Lange (2013) have a treatment with intermediate endowments similar to our SYM and ASYM treatments and find no differences between a 5 We use the Mann-Whitney U-test with dyad averages as observations unless otherwise mentioned.
Results
contributing frame and this alternative.
Subjects appear to be reluctant to contribute early on in the positive framing treatment, but are able to compensate for this throughout the game, as the difference stays significant at 1% up until the fifth round of the game. (Ledyard, 1995) , it has been observed before in repeated two-player games using a comparable mechanism (Van Dijk et al., 2002) . Interestingly, comparing SYM and ASYM, the hypothesis of equal contributions is rejected if they are calculated relative to the status quo (p = 0.035), but not relative to the Nash equilibrium outcome, which may suggest that the latter is a more important reference point. Indeed, the variance of subjects' decisions is larger in ASYM than in SYM and FRAME in 31 of the 35 rounds (Levene's test, p < 0.01; see also figure 2). Interestingly, this difference only becomes significant from the third round onwards, which indicates that it is at least partly driven by the dynamics in the game. Not only the variance across subjects, but also the variance within each subject's set of 35 decisions is greater in ASYM 7 . Summing the number of destructive contributions of each dyad we find a difference only between SYM and ASYM (p = 0.094). Interestingly, the generally higher level of conflict observed in ASYM is also confirmed by the observation that the percentage of destructive decisions in the last round (when there are no strategic considerations present) is higher in ASYM than in the other treatments, and even a bit higher than the overall percentage in this treatment. Figure 2 : Between-subject variance across treatments/rounds It appears that sour relationships do indeed develop in our FPG game. We take as criterion that both partners in a dyad make destructive decisions in at least 5 of the last 10 rounds, which happened with 8% of the dyads in SYM and with 18% in ASYM, but with none in FRAME (0%). Figure 3 shows two examples of equilibration towards a sour relationship in SYM. Interestingly, we also find evidence of a gender effect. The figures in table 2 suggest that female subjects use the option to destroy more frequently. Separating the dyads into female-female (FF), female-male (FM), and male-male (MM) groups we find that the groups with only female participants show a significantly higher average number of destructive decisions and a lower average contribution level in SYM and ASYM, but not in FRAME, where subjects can only contribute 8 . This is at odds with Fujimoto and Park (2010) , who find higher contributions from women in a taking treatment, but not in a giving treatment. Our result is consistent, though, with findings in the literature on public good games (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2013) that females seem to react stronger to modifications in framing and other game features than men. 
Conclusion
This study shows that substantial destructive behavior can occur even in a public good environment once the opportunity to do so is present. Our baseline Fragile Public Good game -offering players equal room to take from or contribute to a public good, against fully symmetric marginal costs -showed more than 10% destructive decisions. While, unexpectedly, positive framing had significant negative effects on contributing in the early rounds of the game, players compensated for that later on, such that on average 8 FF vs. MM in SYM: number of destructive decisions -p = 0.017; average contributions -p = 0.046; FF vs. MM in ASYM: p = 0.041 and p = 0.011. In ASYM the difference in average contribution between FF and FM dyads is also significant (p = 0.025). See figure 5 in appendix. 9 We exclude subjects whose answers in the different questions making up this measure were below a threshold for answer consistency, a vector length of 700 or less of the maximum 1,000 (Liebrand and McClintock, 1988) , and had to exclude four subjects due to technological problems, leaving 123 subjects in SYM, 52 in FRAME, and 70 in ASYM fewer destructive decisions were observed. Introducing a slight asymmetry by minimally separating the selfish Nash outcome from the initial status quo towards taking one token sharply increased the share of destructive decisions to more than 20% (even in the last round). The FPG game further showed that destructive behavior need not only occur incidentally or intermittently but may also lead to sour relationships, characterized by equilibration towards persistent destructive behavior. Finally, we found evidence of a gender effect, with female subjects being more inclined to make destructive decisions, and that people's social value orientation is predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices in the game. 7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  7  84  94  104  114  124  134  144  154  164  174  184  194  204  214  224  6  98  108  118  128  138  148  158  168  178  188  198  208  218  228  238  5  110  120  130  140  150  160  170  180  190  200  210  220  230  240  250  4  120  130  140  150  160  170  180  190  200  210  220  230  240  250  260  3  128  138  148  158  168  178  188  198  208  218  228  238  248  258  268  2  134  144  154  164  174  184  194  204  214  224  234  244  254  264  274  1  138  148  158  168  178  188  198  208  218  228  238  248  258  268  278  0  140  150  160  170  180  190  200  210  220  230  240  250  260  270  280  1  138  148  158  168  178  188  198  208  218  228  238  248  258  268  278  2  134  144  154  164  174  184  194  204  214  224  234  244  254  264  274  3  128  138  148  158  168  178  188  198  208  218  228  238  248  258  268  4  120  130  140  150  160  170  180  190  200  210  220  230  240  250  260  5  110  120  130  140  150  160  170  180  190  200  210  220  230  240  250  6  98  108  118  128  138  148  158  168  178  188  198  208  218  228  238  7  84  94  104  114  124  134  144  154  164  174  184  194  204  214 
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